天津职业技术师范大学学报

针对电商平台大数据“杀熟”问题，在梳理我国电商平台发展及其监管相关文献的基础上，分析电商平台与政府博弈过程及策略选择的影响因素，运用演化博弈理论，构造电商平台与政府间的演化博弈模型，并着重分析初始状态对4种演化稳定状态的影响和各影响因素在{不“杀熟”，大数据监管}这一情形中的作用及演化路径。在此基础上，分别从技术、法律和消费者层面提出相应的管理建议，以保证我国电商市场的海晏河清与消费者权益。

To study the big data-enabled price discrimination in e-commerce platforms,an evolutionary game model between e-commerce platforms and the government is constructed using the evolutionary game theory on the basis of literature review on the development of e-commerce platforms and their supervision in China,and analysis of the influencing factors in the e-commerce platform and the government′s game process and strategy selection. More efforts were invested in studying the impact of the initial state on the four evolutionary stable states and the role and evolution path of each influencing factor in the case of {no price discrimination,big data supervision}. On this basis,corresponding management suggestions are put forward in terms of technology,laws,and consumers to ensure the integrity of China ′s e-commerce market and the rights and interests of consumers.